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Abstract
The article considers themainmodels incorporated in the developed software package
for modeling reliability indicators of nuclear reactor unit (RF) complex technical
systems by the Monte Carlo method. Approaches to organization of system state
determination on the layout basis into groups, principles of accounting for dependent
failures and incomplete recovery are described.
Two distribution laws are provided as ones for a random time distribution to failure of
the modeled system single element. Relations are given for the generation of random
time to failure when using these distributions.
Since the most of reactor safety systems operate in standby mode, a separate
consideration is given to the organization of systems operating simulations in standby
mode. It is important that the elements of such systems are periodically tested, and this
periodicity can be different for different elements of the one system. Tests / testing
availability of safety systems significantly affects the evaluation of their performance
indicators. Therefore, the developed program complex takes into account the tests
availability and their different frequency for individual elements of one system. The
implementation description of accounting for periodic testing in the framework of
reliability modeling is also given in this paper.
The various types’ features of recovery are considered, in terms of their account
at modeling. So, for example, instant recovery of some elements of the system
and random for others, are possible. A specific attention is paid to the principles of
accounting for different types of recovery in the modeling, together with the influence
of dependent failures. Estimates of reliability indicators depend significantly on the
types of recovery, and if the different nature of the recovery time and the time of its
start is not taken into account, there may be a significant distortion of the modeling
results.
Incomplete recovery‘s estimation is made on a base of the relatively simple heuristic
model described in this paper. The use of the proposed incomplete recovery model is
provided for modeling the reliability of the system.
The operation principle of the developed calculation code for modeling the reliability
of NPP complex technical systems is precisely described, taking into account all the
specified features.
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1. Introduction
In the nuclear industry, significant attention given to the tasks of ensuring and man-
aging the reliability of complex technical systems. Since NPP realize potentially dan-
gerous technology, reliability indicators (RI) determine not only economic efficiency
units, but also their safety properties.
Nuclear reactor systems RI can be estimated reliably only in the end of the facility’s
operation and the limit state’ attainment in order to have definite realizations of ran-
domvariables characterizing its reliability [1]. Thanks to them it is possible to determine
correctly the mean time to failure of the restorable object, the average recovery time,
the number of failures, etc. However, this is not the most rational approach, and its
application to NPP systems is often impossible, since most equipment and systems
have not yet reached a operating lifetime.
An alternative to full-scale testing and evaluation of actual operational data about
the elements and systems‘ reliability are methods of structural reliability modeling on
the base of statistical modeling (the Monte-Carlo method).
Whenmodeling real technical systems RI one should take into account: it has a com-
plex mode of operation, the duration of recovery is random and there is dependence
between failure elements. In such cases, the use of the methodology for constructing
failure trees is difficult, and the obtained estimates are ”optimistic”. It is also difficult to
estimate the reliability of the system characteristics, which elements have incomplete
recovery (element is not restored to 100%).
The initiated program complex allows solving the problems stated above, e.g.:
• to calculate the elements and systems‘ RI, on basis on their reliability data and
structural scheme of the system;
• to take into account dependencies between the failures of individual elements
when modeling RI‘s estimates;
• to consider the incomplete recovery of individual elements when modeling RI‘s
estimates;
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• to assign different options to estimate the recovery duration after the indepen-
dent failure and to model a nature of the after-failure recovery.
The program complex was prepared on the base of Python programming language [2].
When calculating the RI statistical tests (Monte Carlo method) count methodology was
used [3-4] with a help of reliability structural charts [5-7].
2. Prerequisites for modeling the reactor plant
systems‘ reliability
A specific feature of RI is their functional and numerical characteristics of random
variables, such as [1]:
• operating time of the object to failure (operating time to failure for non-
renewable elements);
• the recovery efficiency of the object after the failure (duration of unplanned,
emergency repairs);
• the number of failures of the restored object for the considered interval of oper-
ation.
Using a Monte-Carlo method (MCM) is reasonable if there’s a probabilistic analysis
of complex real processes providing the structural features of the system [7-8]. The
process of the system functioning within MCM is a stream of random events which are
changes in the state of the system occurring at random times. The change in the state
of the system is due to the resulting failures and recovery of its parts and elements
[1].
The moment of each individual element’s failure is calculated on the basis of its
reliability data. The parameters of no-failure operation’s distribution law are an initial
data on the element’s reliability. The program complex (PC) can use one of the two
distribution laws: exponential and Weibull [9].
Choosing these two types of non-failure distribution law is based on the fact that
failures of highly reliable systems‘ elements should be rare. The individual elements
are often complex technical devices, consisting of the nodes‘ set. Failure‘s flows of such
elements will be subject to the extreme values‘ central theorem (described by Frechet
distributions) [10-11]. There are three forms for Frechet distributions: the negative time
for exponential distribution, the intermediate form for Weibull distribution; the limiting
form is the distribution of Gumbel. The latterwas not usedwhen designing the program
because of unassailability to get the limited (steady) failure’s flow state.
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RF systems can have a simple or complex mode of operation [12]. For a simple
mode of operation, the periods of work and downtime, caused by the need to restore
elements after a failure (periods of unscheduled emergency repairs), are typical.
The complex mode of operation is typical for reactor emergency systems, nuclear
power plant safety systems, which are in a stand-by mode most of the time. During
this stand-by period an element does not perform its basic functions, but should be
absolutely ready to be used as intended. This need (to use it) occurs at random times
when a no-failure operation of the system is required and this guarantees a success-
ful execution of its functions. There can be latent failures at downtime; they can be
detected at the moments of system element’s scheduled testing or when it’s time to
perform some functions by an element. The most frequently detected failures during
testing are failures to claim [1].
The paper considers modelling of the following RIs:
• mean time between failures 𝑇mbf (mean time between failures);
• the average recovery time 𝑇ar;
• probability to respond promptly (quickly) to the demand 𝑃o.s.t (t);
• availability ratio 𝑅av.
3. Principles to organize a reliability modeling of
NPP systems by the Monte Carlo method
The program complex consists of some parts:
• a connection unit for the internal modules and Python libraries
• functions‘ unit
• a unit to connect files with the original data,
• the main part (unit)
• a unit to calculate RI on the base of modeled data and a file recording of the
results.
The database is organized in two files. The first file provides information about general
data on the system and its elements. The second one provides data on the structural
scheme of the system. The files have a format «*.json», which is convenient to fill in
and read when running of a program and during its operation.
The structure of the main part depends on the modeled mode of operation. The
program flow runs as many times as the tests are set in its basic data.
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The data obtained in the modeling are stored in a file in a format «*.xlsx» the format
of Microsoft Exсel). Due to these data it is possible to estimate single and complex RI
for simple and complex systems, recoverable and non-recoverable equipment.
3.1. Recreating the structural scheme in modeling
The structural block diagram of reliability is made on the basis of project information
about the system, in which purposes, principle of functioning, modes of operation are
specified. Elements can be connected to serial, parallel and mixed connections [13-15].
Recover of the structural block diagram is realized by combining the elements in
groups of connection type in the developed PC [16]. A group can consist of elements
and / or subgroups. An important and specific feature is that the elements may be
present in different groups at a time if it does not interfere with the general logic (e.g.,
when an element is one for three groups, but each group has a reserve). Thus it can be
considered the effect of one element on several groups at once. This approach solves
the problem of modeling such bridge structures or where there is no definite division
type of compound elements.
The joining of elements in a group can be serial or parallel. For example, according
to Fig. 1 the «group 1» consists of elements «e1», «e2»; «group 2» consists of «e3»,
«e4», «e5». The group, when modeling, is presented as a ”virtual” element, for which
the concept of failure is also applicable. For example, Fig. «group 0» is composed of the
parallel elements «group 1», «group 2», thus they can be regarded as virtual elements.
For groups with parallel connection of elements a criterion of failure as the number
of operable elements, which is necessary for successful operation group (system) (e.g.,
2 working items-of- 3 «group 2») can be specified.
Code for analyzing a structural block diagram is given in ASS function with a passed
list of failed elements. The function returns the result in the form of a list with elements
which led to system’s failure. If the list is without elements - the system did not fail, if
it contains the element numbers - the system failed.
The analysis of the structural block diagram begins with an analysis of the failure of
those groups that include the failed elements. The faulty groups which were found are
becoming ”virtual” elements. A cycle of serial analysis is run in order to find out the
influence of each ”virtual” element on the group which it belongs (analysis is made
from a more nested to a less nested group). Each time, in case of failure of this group,
it becomes the new ”virtual” element and then the higher group is analyzed in the
hierarchy, and so on.











Figure 1: An example of elements‘ combining into groups of reliability structural block diagram.
If the number of the last failed group is zero, it is considered the system to have
failed. A list of the elements that caused the system’s failure is created (in the groups
that led to the failure of Group 0). If neither of the initially failed groups fails the system,
then the system is considered not to fail. The list of elements that caused the system’s
failure is formed empty.
Thus, the analysis algorithm of the block diagram can model structures with a high
degree of nesting, memorize faulty groups and exclude from analysis groups with no
detected failure.
3.2. Modeling the independent failure of an individual element
Failures of elements occur at random times. The interval before the onset of a new fail-
ure is modeled using a pseudo-random number generator in the following sequence:
1. ”Draw” uniformly distributed random numbers 𝑅𝑖 in the range from 0 to 1;
2. A time till his failure 𝑡𝑖 is calculated (estimated) due to type of no-failure opera-
tion‘s time distribution law and its parameters.
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Getting a random time interval with a predetermined distribution law 𝑓(𝑡) and uni-
formly distributed number 𝑅𝑖 in the interval (0, 1) is a result of a solution to equation





This equality with 𝑓(𝑡) > 0 specifies the one correspondence between the variables
𝑅𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖, and allows to obtain a random number corresponding to an arbitrary distri-
bution law 𝑓(𝑡) of the random number, distributed uniformly on the interval (0, 1).
In the case of the exponential distribution law it is:
𝑡𝑖 = −
1
𝜆 ⋅ ln(1 − 𝑅𝑖) (1)
For the Weibull distribution law it is:
𝑡𝑖 = −
1
𝜆 ⋅ (− ln(1 − 𝑅𝑖))
1
𝛼 (2)
3.3. Modeling the dependent failure of an individual element
Dependence between failures of elements can considerably worsen properties of sys-
tem‘s reliability in comparison with the similar system where it is not observed. Taking
into account this dependence can significantly increase the assessment of the likeli-
hood (probability) of failures. [17]
There are many techniques for modeling dependent failures. The developed pro-
gram complex accounts dependent failures by using the coupling coefficient 𝐾𝑖,𝑗 . The
use of more complex models for dependent failures is another research topic and
requires a separate research work.
The coefficient (index) is given by experts and takes values from 0 to 1. The value
«0» indicates that the influence of 𝑖-th on 𝑗-th element is absent, and the value «1»
means that a failure of 𝑖-th element leads to a significant failure of 𝑗-th.
A failure moment of time for the 𝑗-th element due to failure of 𝑖-th is estimated
according to the following algorithm:
1) it is determined whether there is dependence between the failed 𝑖-th element
and the unfailed 𝑗-th element;
2) if there is a dependence (𝐾 𝑖,𝑗 > 0), the condition (3) is checked and if the last is
fulfilled there is a dependent failure of 𝑗-th element:
𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑖) > (1 − 𝐾𝑖,𝑗) ⋅ 𝑅𝑗 , (3)
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wherein 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑖) - a value of the 𝑗-th element‘s failure probability at the time of 𝑖-th
element failure; 𝑅𝑗 - probability of 𝑗-th element‘s failure, ie, 𝑅𝑗 = 𝐹𝑗(𝑡𝑖).
The relationship between failures 𝐾𝑖,𝑗 is assumed to be linear. This is due to the fact
that the 𝐾𝑖,𝑗, as was mentioned above, is determined by experts who estimate how
𝑖-th element‘s failure will affect the probability of 𝑗-th element failure.
3.4. Modeling recovery duration
After modeling the occurrence of failure recovery duration of the 𝑖-th element is mod-
eled.
Duration of recovery can be specified by one of three options:
• an instant (immediate) recovery;
• an occasional duration;
• a determined, constant duration of recovery;
• discrete, predefined time intervals.
In the modelling of instant recovery, it is assumed to be an immediate element’s per-
formance recovery after a failure. This means a complete substitution of the element
by the new one.
When calculating random duration of the 𝑖-th element‘s recovery a random normally
distributed number is generated (truncated normal distribution is used). This number is
further scaled in accordance with parameters predetermined for 𝑖−th element (mean
and standard deviation). Modelling the random recovery duration is used when it is
certainly (obviously) impossible to guess how long it will take to repair an element.
Modeling this recovery duration in the form of a predetermined time interval refers
to the known (certain) time interval required for the element‘s repair.
A recovery of dependent failed element can be realized in the developed complex
in three ways:
• after recovery of the element caused dependent failure;
• in parallel with recovery of the element caused dependent failure;
• at the same time with an element caused dependent failure.
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3.5. Modeling incomplete recovery
In world practice, when analyzing the reliability of repaired objects, it is considered that
after recovery the object is restored to 100%. In fact, in most cases, when repairing
complex equipment it is impossible to replace or repair its components so that it does
not affect its reliability in the future. The item is restored to a certain percentage of its
original state. Accounting for incomplete recovery brings the conditions of modeling
to reality.
When developing program complex the most realistic method of obtaining informa-
tion about incomplete recovery 𝑖−th element is used, it‘s a expert evaluation method.
For that purpose a coefficient 𝑘rec,𝑖 is applied, it belongs to the range from 0 to 1.
At the beginning of modeling all the elements have the 100% level of serviceabil-
ity, i.e. 𝑘rec,𝑖 = 1. After each recovery the element‘s serviceability decreases by some
amount Δrec,𝑖, which also lies in the interval [0, 1].
𝑘𝑙+1rec,𝑖 = 𝑘𝑙rec,𝑖 − Δrec,𝑖, (4)
where 𝑙- number of recovery (𝑙 = 0,..., 𝑛); 𝑖- element‘s number; - 𝑘𝑙rec,𝑖 coefficient
got from the registration of the previous incomplete recovery; 𝑘𝑙+1rec,𝑖- coefficient of
incomplete recovery after a new failure.
When the 𝑘rec,𝑖 reaches a certain point 𝑘limrec,𝑖, after which the element‘s recovery
becomes useless, it is replaced with a new one. For this element - 𝑘rec,𝑖 = 1 (100%).
Defining of the time to failure in incomplete recovery is performed using the follow-
ing equation:
𝐹𝑖(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑅𝑖 ⋅ 𝑘𝑙+1rec,𝑖. (5)
Coefficients 𝑘limrec,𝑖 and Δrec,𝑖 are defined with the help of expert evaluation method.
3.6. Modeling the system operation process which
is working in a complex mode
Much attention is given to modeling and system‘s modeling algorithms with a simple
working mode, the review is given in the papers [1, 8, 9, 18, 19]. Therefore, this article
focuses on modeling the system operation process which is working in a complex
mode.
Figure 2 is a timing diagram showing schematically the process of operation of such
a system, where the following notations (symbols) are:
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𝜏𝑘o, 𝑖, 𝜏𝑘r, 𝑖 - duration of no-failure operation and recovery for the 𝑘-th element, respec-
tively (𝑖 - fault number, 𝑘 = 1,..., 𝑛);
𝑇 𝑘fl, 𝑖- point of time when a 𝑘−th element‘s latent failure occurs;
𝑀𝑘fl,𝑖, 𝑀
𝑘
r𝑒𝑐,𝑖 - time of a failure and recovery detection for the 𝑘−th element, respec-
tively;
𝑀𝑘test, 𝑗- point of time for the 𝑗-th sampling (testing) of the 𝑘-th element (𝑗 = 1,... 𝐽 );
𝑀𝑘,depfl, 𝑖 - point of time of dependent failure detection for the 𝑘 th element;
𝐼𝑘fl - the time interval between failures of the 𝑘-th element.
𝑆𝑖– point of time when system‘s state changes in 𝑀𝑘fl, 𝑖;
𝐼sysfl,𝑞 - the time interval between failure of the system during the waiting period;
𝑀sysrec,𝑞- point in time of recovery during the waiting period;
[𝑇start, 𝑇finish]- the interval of time when the system performs its functions;
𝜏𝑘fl - the time interval before a failure of the 𝑘−th element on the interval [0, 𝑇finish];
𝑀𝑘fl,𝑖 - failure and recovery time for the 𝑘−th element on the interval [𝑇start, 𝑇finish];
𝐼𝑘fl - time interval from the start of 𝑘-th element‘s application to its failure [𝑇
𝑘
start, fl]
on the interval [𝑇start, 𝑇finish];
𝑆′𝑖 - point of time when system‘s state changes 𝑀𝑘fl on the interval [𝑇start, 𝑇finish];
𝐼sys
′
fl, 𝑙 - the time interval before system‘s failure on the interval [𝑇start, 𝑇finish];
𝑀𝑛rec,𝑀
sys′
rec, 𝑙 - point of time for the 𝑘−th element and system‘s recovery, respectively,
after a period [𝑇start, 𝑇finish] (𝑙- the number of failure).
System‘s operating process is composed of two-time domains – a standbymode and
a mode with no recovery (a possibility to recover is absent).
The first domain [0, 𝑇start] is divided into periods between elements testing (check-
ing). It is possible to detect latent failures (on request), and failure detection (for
example type «flow») here.
The second domain [𝑇start, 𝑇finish] means the system‘s elements are introduced simul-
taneously into operation and the elements‘ recovery is not possible during this period.
System‘s failure is determined by consecutive failures of elements in a specific interval.
Failed elements‘ recovery is possible only after period‘s ending.





















Standby period Period of application 
 
































Figure 2: Timing diagram schematically showing the system operating in a complex mode consisting of 𝑛
elements.
The values that characterize the system and its element‘s operation at standby
period, are related by:
𝑇 𝑘fl, 1 = 𝜏
𝑘
>, 1,
𝑇 𝑘fl, 𝑖 = 𝑀
𝑘
rec, 𝑖 + 𝜏𝑘>, 𝑖,
𝑀𝑘fl, 𝑖 = 𝑀
𝑘
test, 𝑗 , if 𝑀
𝑘
test, 𝑗−1 < 𝑇
𝑘
fl, 𝑖 = 𝑀
𝑘
test, 𝑗 ,
𝑀𝑘2, 𝑖 = 𝑀𝑘fl, 𝑖 + 𝜏
𝑘
r, 𝑖,
𝑀𝑘,depfl, 𝑖 = 𝑀
𝑘
fl, 𝑖,
𝑀𝑘,deprec, 𝑖 = 𝑀
𝑘,dep








𝑆sysfl, 𝑖 = 𝑀
𝑘
fl, 𝑖,
𝐼sysfl, 𝑞 = 𝑀
𝑘
fl, 𝑖 − 𝑆
sys
fl, 𝑞−1,
𝑀sysrec, 𝑖 = max(𝑀𝑘rec, 𝑖).
(6)
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The values characterizing the system and elements‘ operation during application




𝑀𝑘rec = 𝑇finish + 𝜏𝑘r ,













fl, 𝑙 = 𝑆
sys
fl, 𝑙 − 𝑇start,
𝑀sys
′
rec, 𝑙 = max(𝑀𝑘rec).
(7)
Consider the sequence of simulation tests and elements of the system in standby
mode.
Before the simulation is performed preparing the initial conditions to start the cycle,
which is executed until the time of the previous sampling system𝑀start is less than or
equal to the time system monitoring 𝑇𝐴. Before starting a cycle 𝑀start = 0.
For each element, the latent time of failure is modeled 𝑇 𝑘fl,𝑖in accordance with rela-
tions (6) (in the simulation of the first failure in all elements of the system are listed).
If 𝑇 𝑘fl, 𝑖 longer follow-up period of the system 𝑇𝐴, then the element is eliminated from
the simulation under this test. If all the elements were eliminated from the study, it
will be terminated. For the (𝑖 + 1) failures is considered incomplete recovery when
determining the probability of failure for those elements for which this is necessary.









If it is satisfied, it is considered that the element has a latent failure 𝑇 𝑘fl, 𝑗 in the interval
[𝑀𝑘test, 𝑗−1, 𝑀
𝑘
test, 𝑗]. Between the previous and current testing of 𝑀
𝑘
test, 𝑗 this element,
which enters the system at the time of sampling 𝑀finish. The hidden element failures
considered to be detected at a time 𝑀𝑘test, 𝑗 . Such verification is introduced due to the
fact that the sampling frequency of the elements may be different (once a month,
once a year), but the minimum period between the multiple sampling.
After, item numbers added to the list regardless refused. For them, the simu-
lated recovery duration 𝜏𝑘rec, 𝑗 , recovery time𝑀𝑘rec, 𝑖 is determined by the time interval
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between the detection of a failure 𝐼𝑘fl , according to suitable their expressions from (6)
and the serial number of failure. For regardless self-failed elements of the formulas
(6) are determined by the time of failure 𝑀𝑘,detfl,𝑖 , the time of recovery𝑀
sys
rec, 𝑞, the time
between failures, failure number.
Runs analysis of the system. If the system failed, then it is determined at time of
failure 𝑆𝑖 (it is equal to the time of failure detection elements during testing), the
interval between failures 𝐼sysfl, 𝑞, by the relations (6), fault number.
For all elements of the following time points simulate sampling system between
𝑀𝑘test, 𝑗 and𝑀
𝑘
test, 𝑗−1. The value of the previous time the sampling system is overridden
𝑀start = 𝑀finish. Checking if the loop condition.
After the simulation of the system in standbymode ismodeled during its application.
Referring to Figure 2, this region [𝑇start, 𝑇finish]. Simulation run separately. Consider
the structure of the main part of the program for one test (in this case, the test - a
simulation of the system operation in the operating mode cannot be restored).
The sequence of the algorithm:
1. With the help of a random number generator is played uniformly distributed ran-
dom number 𝑃sys - the probability of the system to go from standby to operating
mode. In fact it is the likelihood of a situation for which the systemmust respond.
2. Calculated at time 𝑇start and 𝑇finish from the following relations
𝑇start = 𝑃sys ⋅ 𝑇𝐴,
𝑇finish = 𝑇start + 𝑡𝑎,
Where 𝑇𝐴 - the existence of the system; 𝑡𝑎 - the duration of the system will perform
its functions.
1. For each element of simulated time of the first (and only) failure 𝑀𝑘fl .
2. Among the elements whose failure falls on [𝑇start, 𝑇finish], is determined by the
element with minimum failure time - the first failed element.
3. From the failed component establishes a relationship failed elements. For these
elements a new time of failure is recorded.
4. Checks for a system failure due to failed elements.
5. If the system is not denied, it is checked whether there was a failure of the other
element after the already proven.
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6. In case of failure, the failed element are performed for step 5. After that number
of the failed element and regardless failed elements are added to the elements,
failures which are already installed. Performed step 6.
7. Items 5 - 9 are repeated until the system fails or runs out faulty elements in the
interval. In the event of failure of the system to save the number of its failure and
the time of failure of time in accordance with the formulas (7).
8. For the system elements and slots to failure record is the same, by the relations
(2 - 6) 𝐼sys
′
fl, 𝑙 , 𝐼
𝑘
fl respectively.
9. Duration of recovery is modeling, also recovery time points for the elements and
systems, in accordance with (7). It should again be noted that the recovery of
the elements and the system is modeled only after completion of the period of
application in the case of necessity and possibility.
After modeling for both periods RI are evaluated for all tests.
4. Conclusion
It should be noted, that implemented model of the individual elements‘ functioning
and their relationships, in terms of reliability in the developed program complex, allow
to obtain estimates of reliability indices which are very close to reality. In addition,
the designed complex allows to obtain characteristics unavailable in the majority of
software, for example, maintainability and durability characteristics of the analyzed
system.
References
[1] AI Nadjozhnost Klemin ’jadernyh jenergeticheskih ustanovok: Osnovy raschjota
[Reliability of nuclear power plants: Basics of calculation]. Moscow. Energoatomiz-
dat Publ. 1987. 344 p. (in Russian).
[2] Prohorenok NA, VA Dronov Python 3 and PyQt 5. Razrabotka prilozhenij [Python
3 and PyQt 5. Application development]. Saint Petersburg. Peterburg-of BHV Publ.
2016. 832 p. (in Russian).
[3] The IM Komp’juternoemodelirovanie belova: Uchebno-metodicheskoe posobie dlja
studentov [Computer modeling: the Educational-methodical manual for students].
Moscow. MSIU Publ. 81, 2008. p. (in Russian).
DOI 10.18502/keg.v3i3.1606 Page 67
 
AtomFuture-2017
[4] Wentzel ES Issledovanie operacij [Operations research]. Moscow. «Sovetskoe
radio» Publ. 1972. 552 p. (in Russian).
[5] The MM Egunov, Minina EA’s, Tribunskij the DS, the VP Shuvalov Strukturnaja
nadezhnost ’setej svjazi: Uchebnoe posobie [Structural reliability What Networks
of communication: Textbook]. Yekaterinburg. UICI ”SibSUTI” Publ. 2011. 54 p. (in
Russian).
[6] Novikov AE, Shibitova NV Nadezhnost ’tehnicheskih sistem. Strukturnaja nadezh-
nost ’/ Kratkij kurs lekcij i zadanija dlja vypolnenija SRS [Reliability of technical sys-
tems. Reliability Structural / Short course of lectures and tasks for implementation
IWS]. Volgograd. VSTU Publ. 2016. 64 p. (in Russian).
[7] Ostrejkovskiy V. A. Shviryaev the Yu. V. Bezopasnost ’ atomnyh stancij. Analiz
Verojatnostnyj [Safety of nuclear on power plants. Probabilistic analysis]. Moscow.
FIZMATLIT Publ. 2008. 353 p. (in Russian).
[8] Fedukhin A. V,. Cespedes - Garcia N. V. Modeling the reliability of a is recoverable
system with a ” cold ” reserve and an unreliable Restoration authority. Matem-
aticheskie mashiny i sistemy. In 2007, the no.2, pp. 125-131. (in Russian).
[9] Aivazyan S. A., Enyukov I. S., Meshalkin L. D. Prikladnaja statistika : Osnovy
modelirovanija i pervichnaja obrabotka dannyh. Izd Spravochnoe [an Applied
statistics: Basics of modeling and primary data processing. Referenceedition].
Moscow. I statistika finansy Publ.1983. 471 p. (in Russian).
[10] Gumbel E. Statistika jekstremal ’ nyh znachenij [S tatistical theory of extreme values
and some Practical applications]. Trans. from Eng. Moscow. Mir Publ. 1965. 451 p.
(in Russian).
[11] Johnson NL, Kotz S., Balakrishnan N. Odnomernye nepreryvnye raspredelenija: v 2
chastjah. Chast ’2 [Continuous Univariate Distributions. Volume 2. Second Edition].
Trans. from Eng. Moscow. BINOM. Laboratorija znanij Publ. 2012. 600 p. (in Russian).
[12] Bakhmetev A. M., Samoilov O. Bed and., Usyigin G. B. I obespechenija ocenki
Metody bezopasnosti JaJeU [Methods for and ensuring the assessing safety of
nuclear power plants]. Moscow. Energoatomizdat Publ. 1988. 136 p. (in Russian).
[13] NI Nadezhnost Zadoya ’jelektrosnabzhenija: Uchebnoe posobie [Reliability of
electricity supply: Textbook]. Rubtsovsk. Rubtsovsk Industrial Institute Publ. 2014.
47 p. (in Russian).
[14] VA Osnovy teorii Tselishev nadezhnosti: konspekt lekcij [Fundamentals of the
theory of reliability: a summary of lectures]. Irkutsk. 2015. 148 p. (in Russian).
[15] Sobolev AV, Anisonyan VR, Kochnov O. Yu. Complex for modeling Software the
reliability What of Complicated Contents Technical Systems and ITS application in
DOI 10.18502/keg.v3i3.1606 Page 68
 
AtomFuture-2017
studies of safety of Reactor plants. Sbornik nauchnyh rabot laureatov oblastnyh
premij i stipendij. Kaluga. KSU. The K. E. Tsiolkovsky Publ. 2012, iss. 8, pp. 140 - 151.
(in Russian).
[16] Tokmachev G. V. Problems of data collection and processing for common mode
failures. Jaderna y ai radiacionn aya bezopasnost. Moscow. The SEC the NRS Publ.
2011. No. 4 (62), pp. 29-39. (in Russian).
[17] Gorsky LK Statisticheskie algortmy issledovanija nadjozhnosti [Statistical algo-
rithms of reliability research]. Moscow. Nauka Publ. 1970. 400 p. (in Russian).
[18] Buslenko NP Metod statisticheskogo modelirovanija [The method of statistical
modeling]. Moscow. Statistika Publ. 1970. 113 p. (in Russian).
DOI 10.18502/keg.v3i3.1606 Page 69
